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BOUNDS FOR THE NAKAMURA NUMBER
JOSEP FREIXAS AND SASCHA KURZ
ABSTRACT. The Nakamura number is an appropriate invariant of a simple game in order to study the existence of social
equilibria and the possibility of cycles. For symmetric quota games its number can be obtained by an easy formula. For
some subclasses of simple games the corresponding Nakamura number has also been characterized. However, in general,
not much is known about lower and upper bounds depending of invariants of simple, complete or weighted games. Here,
we present several results in that direction.
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a committee with a finite set N of committee members. Suppose that a subset S of the committee
members is in favor of variant A of a certain proposal, while all others, i.e., those in N\S, are in favor of variant
B. If the committee’s decision rule is such that both S and N\S can change the status quo, then we may end up in
an infinite chain of status quo changes between variant A and variant B – a very unpleasant and unstable situation.
In the context of simple games the described situation can be prevented easily. One just has to restrict the allowed
class of voting systems to proper simple games, i.e., each two winning coalitions have at least one common player.
As a generalization the Nakamura number of a simple game is the smallest number k such that there exist k winning
coalitions with empty intersection. So, a simple game is proper if and only if its Nakamura number is at least 3.
Indeed, the Nakamura number turned out to be an appropriate invariant of a simple game in order to study the
existence of social equilibria and the possibility of cycles in a more general setting, see [Schofield, 1984]. As the
author coins it, individual convex preferences are insufficient to guarantee convex social preference. If, however,
the Nakamura number of the used decision rule is large enough with respect to the dimension of the involved policy
space, then convex individual preference guarantees convex social preferences. Having this relation at hand, a
stability result of [Greenberg, 1979] on q-majority games boils down to the computation of the Nakamura number
for these games. The original result of [Nakamura, 1979] gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-
emptiness of the core of a simple game obtained from individual preferences. Further stability results in terms
of the Nakamura number are e.g. given by [Le Breton and Salles, 1990]. A generalization to coalition structures
can be found in [Deb et al., 1996]. For other notions of stability and acyclicity we refer e.g. to [Martin, 1998,
Schwartz, 2001, Truchon, 1996]. Unifications of related theorems have been presented in [Saari, 2014].
Here we study lower and upper bounds for the Nakamura number of different types of voting games. For
the mentioned q-majority games with n players the Nakamura could be analytically determined to be
⌈
n
n−q
⌉
by
[Ferejohn and Grether, 1974] and [Peleg, 1978]. For general weighted games with normalized weights, i.e., with
weight sum one, we prove that the corresponding expression
⌈
1
1−q
⌉
is a lower bound for the Nakamura number.
While relatively tight bounds for the Nakamura number of weighted games can be obtained, the natural invariants
of simple and complete simple games allow only weaker bounds. The excess minimization problem in the first
stage of a nucleolus computation allows an adequate counterpart for weights in the case on non-weighted cases and
partially allows to improve bounds for weighted games. Additionally we show up a relation to the one-dimensional
cutting stock problem.
[Kumabe and Mihara, 2008] studied the 32 combinations of five properties of simple games. In each of the
cases the authors determined the generic Nakamura number or the best possible lower bound if several values can
be attained. As a generalization of simple games with more than two alternatives, so-called (j, k)-simple games
have been introduced, see e.g. [Freixas and Zwicker, 2009]. The notion of the Nakamura number and a first set of
stability results for (j, 2)-simple games have been transfered by [Tchantcho et al., 2010].
The remaining part of the paper is organized in follows. In Section 2 we define simple games, the Nakamura
number for simple games and state related lower and upper bounds. Special subclasses of simple games, including
weighted games, are studied in Section 3. The maximum possible Nakamura number within special subclasses of
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simple games is the topic of Section 4. Further relation of the Nakamura number to other concepts of cooperative
game theory are discussed in Section 5. In this context the one-dimensional cutting stock problem is treated in
Subsection 5.1. Some enumeration results for special subclasses of complete and weighted simple games and their
corresponding Nakamura numbers are given in Section 6. We close with a conclusion in Section 7.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND BOUNDS FOR SIMPLE GAMES
A pair (N, v) is called simple game if N is a finite set, v : 2N → {0, 1} satisfies v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and
v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N . In this paper we limit ourselves to non-trivial monotonic simple games. The
subsets of N are called coalitions and N is called the grand coalition. By n = |N | we denote the number of
players. If v(S) = 1, we call S a winning coalition and a losing coalition otherwise. ByW we denote the set of
winning coalitions and by L the set of losing coalitions. If S is a winning coalition such that each proper subset is
losing we call S a minimal winning coalition. Similarly, if T is a losing coalition such that each proper superset is
winning, we call T a maximal losing coalition. By Wm we denote the set of minimal winning coalitions and by
LM we denote the set of maximal losing coalitions. We remark that each of the setsW , L,Wm and LM uniquely
characterizes a simple game. Instead of (N, v) we also write (N,W) for a simple game. Next we introduce special
kinds of players in a simple game.
Definition 1. Let (N, v) be a simple game. A player i ∈ N such that i ∈ S for all winning coalitions S is called a
vetoer. Each player i ∈ N that is not contained in any minimal winning coalition is called a null player. If {i} is a
winning coalition, we call player i a passer. If {i} is the unique minimal winning coalition, then we call player i a
dictator.
Note that a dictator is the strongest form of being both a passer and a vetoer. Obviously, there can be at most
one dictator.
Definition 2. Given a simple game (N,W) its Nakamura number, cf. [Nakamura, 1979], ν(N,W) is given by the
minimum number of winning coalitions whose intersection is empty. If the intersection of all winning coalitions is
non-empty we set ν(N,W) =∞.
Lemma 1. For each simple game (N,W) the Nakamura number ν(N,W) equals the minimum number of minimal
winning coalitions whose intersection is empty.
Proof. Since each minimal winning coalition is also a winning coalition, the Nakamura number is a lower bound.
For the other direction we consider r winning coalitions Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, where ν(N,W) = r and ∩1≤i≤rSi = ∅.
Now let Ti ⊆ Si be an arbitrary minimal winning coalition for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Clearly, we also have ∩1≤i≤rTi =
∅. 
We easily observe:
Lemma 2. For each simple game (N,W) we have ν(N,W) = ∞ if and only if (N,W) contains at least one
vetoer.
Proof. If ν(N,W) = ∞ then U := ∩S∈W 6= ∅, i.e., all players in U are vetoers. If player i is a vetoer, then i is
contained in the intersection of all winning coalitions, which then has to be non-empty. 
Since dictatorship is the strongest form of having a veto we conclude:
Corollary 1. For a simple game (N,W) containing a dictator, we have ν(N,W) =∞.
Lemma 3. Let (N,W) be a simple game with at least one passer and |N | ≥ 2 then
ν(N,W) =
{ ∞ ifW contains a dictator,
2 otherwise.
Proof. Let i be a passer in (N,W). If i is a dictator, then Corollary 1 applies. Otherwise (N,W) contains another
non-null player j ∈ N\{i}. Let S be a minimal winning coalition containing j. Since S is a minimal winning
coalition, we have i /∈ S and the intersection of the winning coalitions {i} and S is empty. 
Lemma 4. For each simple game (N,W) without vetoers we have 2 ≤ ν(N,W) ≤ n.
Proof. Obviously we have ν(N,W) ∈ N>0 ∪ {∞}. Since ∅ is a losing coalition, at least two winning coalitions
are needed to get an empty intersection. Thus, we have ν(N,W) ≥ 2. For each player i ∈ N let Si be a winning
coalition without player i, which needs to exist since player i is not a vetoer. With this we have ∩1≤i≤nSi = ∅, so
that ν(N,W) ≤ n. 
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We can easily state an integer linear programming formulation for the determination of ν(N,W):
Lemma 5. For each simple game (N,W) without vetoers the corresponding Nakamura number ν(N,W) is given
as the optimal target value of:
min r∑
S∈W
xS = r∑
S∈W : i∈S
xS ≤ r − 1 ∀i ∈ N
xS ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ∈ W
Corollary 2. For each simple game (N,W) without vetoers the corresponding Nakamura number ν(N,W) is
given as the optimal target value of:
min r∑
S∈Wm
xS = r∑
S∈Wm : i∈S
xS ≤ r − 1 ∀i ∈ N
xS ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ∈ Wm
Lemma 6. Let m be the minimum cardinality of a (minimal) winning coalition1 of a simple game (N,W). With
this we have ν(N,W) ≥
⌈
n
n−m
⌉
. If (N,W) has no vetoers, then ν(N,W) ≤ m+ 1.
Proof. We set r = ν(N,W) and choose r winning coalitions S1, . . . , Sr with empty intersection. Starting with
I0 := N , we recursively set Ii := Ii−1 ∩ Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. By induction we prove |Ii| ≥ n − i · (n −m) for all
0 ≤ i ≤ r. The statement is true for I0 by definition. For i ≥ 1 we have |Ii−1| ≥ n − (i − 1) · (n −m). Since
|Si| ≥ m we have |Ii−1 ∩ Si| ≥ |Ii−1|− (n−m) ≥ n− i · (n−m). Thus we have ν(N,W) ≥
⌈
n
n−m
⌉
, where we
set n0 =∞ and remark that this can happen only, if N is the unique winning coalition, i.e., all players are vetoers.
This proves the lower bound.
For the upper bound let S be a minimal winning coalition with minimum cardinality m. Let Ti = N\{i} for all
i ∈ S. With this, we have (∩i∈STi)∩S = ∅, where the Ti are winning coalitions since (N,W) has no vetoers. 
We remark that the lower bound of Lemma 6 is tight for all values of n,m ∈ N>0, where n ≥ m. An example
is given by the simple game uniquely characterized by the minimal winning coalitions
{1, . . . ,m} , {m+ 1, . . . , 2m} , . . . , {(j − 1)m+ 1, . . . , jm}
for j =
⌈
n
n−m
⌉
− 1 and {n−m+ 1, . . . , n}. The upper bound of Lemma 6 is also tight for all positive integers
n > m. An example is given by the simple game uniquely characterized by the minimal winning coalitions S and
Ti for i ∈ S, as described in the proof of Lemma 6.
We can turn the packing-type proof of Lemma 6 into a constructive heuristic to obtain another upper bound for
the Nakamura number of a simple game.
Lemma 7. Let M be the maximum cardinality of a minimal winning coalition in a simple game (N,W). Then, we
have ν(N,W) ≤
⌈
n
n−M
⌉
.
Proof. If M = n, we obtain the trivial bound ν(N,W) ≤ ∞ so that we assume M ≤ n − 1. As in the proof of
Lemma 6 we recursively define Ii := Ii−1 ∩ Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and set I0 = N . In order to construct a winning
coalition Si we determine U = N\{Ii−1} and choose a max(0,M − |U |)-element subset V of Ii−1. With this we
set Si = U ∪ V . If |Si| > M , we remove some arbitrary elements so that |Si| = M , i.e. all coalitions Si have
cardinality exactly M and thus are winning for all i ≥ 1. By induction we prove |Ii| ≥ max(0, n− i · (n−M)),
so that the stated upper bound follows. 
1A winning coalition of minimum cardinality is clearly a minimal winning coalition.
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We remark that Lemma 7 is tight for e.g. m = M , where ν(N,W) =
⌈
n
n−M
⌉
due to Lemma 6. By slightly
modifying the proof strategy we obtain a greedy type heuristic. Instead of choosing V arbitrarily completing Si
to cardinality M , we may choose a minimum cardinality V such that Si = U ∪ V becomes a winning coalition.
Especially we may start with a minimal winning coalition of minimum size. Note that
⌈
n
n−M
⌉
≤ m + 1, i.e., the
upper bound in Lemma 7 is more accurate than the upper bound in Lemma 6.
Corollary 3. For a given simple game (N,W) let m be the cardinality of its smallest minimal winning coalition
and M be the cardinality of its largest minimal winning coalition. Assume M ≤ n− 1. With this we have
ν(N,W) ≤ 1 +
⌈
m
n−M
⌉
Let S be a winning coalition of a simple game (N, v). Then, (S, v|S), where v|S(T ) = v(T ) for all T ⊆ S is a
simple game. Removing null players from a simple game does not change its Nakamura number.
Lemma 8. Let (N, v) be a simple game andD ⊆ N be its set of null players, then we have ν(N, v) = ν(N\D, v′),
where v′ = v|N\D.
Proof. First we note that N\D is a winning coalition, so that (N\D, v′) is a simple game. If player i is a vetoer in
(N, v) then it remains a vetoer in (N\D, v′). So let r = ν(N, v) and S1, . . . , Sr be winning coalitions of (N, v)
with empty intersection. We set Ti = Si∩(N\D) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r. In (N\D, v′) the Ti are winning coalitions with
empty intersection so that ν(N, v) ≥ ν(N\D, v′). For the other direction let Ti be winning coalitions of (N\D, v′)
with empty intersection. In (N, v) the coalitions Ti remain winning coalitions with empty intersection. 
Lemma 9. Let (N,W) be a simple game without vetoers and d be the number of its null players. We have
ν(N,W) ≤ min (|Wm| , n− d).
Proof. Since ν(N,W) < ∞ we have ν(N,W) ≤ n. Using Lemma 8 we obtain ν(N,W) ≤ n − d. Due
to ν(N,W) < ∞ and Lemma 1 the intersection of all minimal winning coalitions is empty, so that we have
ν(N,W) ≤ |Wm|. 
We remark that the proposed bound is tight: For each integer 2 ≤ k ≤ n we consider the weighted game
[k − 1; 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0], see Definition 4 in Section 3, with k players of weight 1. It has n − k null players,
k minimal winning coalitions and a Nakamura number of k. We further remark that |Wm| = 1 implies that all
players of the unique minimal winning coalition are veto players, i.e., the Nakamura number is infinite.
Lemma 10. For two simple games (N,W1) and (N,W2, withW1 ⊆ W2 we have ν(N,W1) ≥ ν(N,W2).
Proof. W.l.o.g. we assume r := ν(N,W1) < ∞ and choose r winning coalitions Si of (N,W1) with empty
intersection. SinceW1 ⊆ W2 the Si are winning in (N,W2) too and we have ν(N,W2) ≤ r. 
Remark 1. For a simple game (N,W) let m be the cardinality of its smallest minimal winning coalition and M
be the cardinality of its largest minimal winning coalition. By D we denote the set of null players of N , where we
assume that only the players with the largest indices are null players, if any at all. All coalitions of cardinality less
than m in N\D are losing and all coalitions of cardinality at least M in N\D are winning so that we have
W1 ⊆ W ⊆ W2,
where (N,W1) = [m; 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0] and (N,W2) = [M ; 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0] with |D| players of weight 1 each.
I.e., we can deduce Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 from Lemma 10 and Equation (1) in Section 3 about weighted games.
Lemma 11. Let (N,W) be a simple game without veto players and S1, . . . , Sk be winning coalitions with
∣∣∩ki=1Si∣∣ =
t, then we have ν(N,W) ≤ t+ k.
Proof. Since the game does not contain vetoers we can complement the list of winning coalitions S1, . . . , Sk by
the winning coalitions N\{j} for all j ∈ ∩ki=1Si. 
Definition 3. A simple game (N,W) is called proper if the complement N\S of any winning coalition S ∈ W is
losing. It is called strong if the complement N\T of any losing coalition T is winning. A simple game that is both
proper and strong is called constant-sum (or self-dual or decisive).
Lemma 12. [Kumabe and Mihara, 2008, Lemma 6] Let (N,W) be a simple game without vetoers. We have
ν(N,W) = 2 if and only if (N,W) is non-proper.
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Proof. Assume that (N,W) is non-proper, i.e., there exist two winning coalitions S and N\S. Thus we have
ν(N,W) = 2 due to S ∩ N\S = ∅ and ν(N,W) ≥ 2. If otherwise ν(N,W) = 2, then there exist two winning
coalitions S and T with S ∩ T = ∅. Since T ⊆ N\S also N\S is a winning coalition so that the game is
non-proper. 
[Kumabe and Mihara, 2008, Lemma 7] states that the Nakamura number of each strong simple game without
vetoers is either 2 or 3. As the combination of both results we obtain:
Lemma 13. For each constant-sum simple game (N,W) without veto players we have ν(N,W) = 3.
Proof. Since the game is proper we have ν(N,W) ≥ 3. Now let S be an arbitrary minimal winning coalition.
Since the game is strong, N\S is a maximal losing coalition. Thus R := N\S ∪ {i}, where i ∈ S is arbitrary, is
a winning coalition. Since player i is not a veto player N\{i} is a winning coalition. We conclude the proof by
noting that the intersection of the winning coalitions S, R, and N\{i} is empty. 
From lemmas 6 and 7 of [Kumabe and Mihara, 2008] we conclude that ν(N,W) > 3 implies that (N,W) is
proper and non-strong.
3. BOUNDS FOR WEIGHTED, α-WEIGHTED, AND COMPLETE SIMPLE GAMES
Definition 4. A simple game (N, v) is weighted if there exists a quota q > 0 and weighs wi ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
such that v(S) = 1 if and only if w(S) =
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q for all S ⊆ N .
As notation we use [q;w1, . . . , wn] for a weighted game. We remark that the weighted representations are far
from being unique. In any case there exist some special weighted representations. By [qˆ; wˆ1, . . . , wˆn] we denote
a weighted representation, where all weights and the quota are integers. Instead of specializing to integers we can
also normalize the weights to sum to one. By [q′;w′1, . . . , w
′
n] we denote a weighted representation with q
′ ∈ (0, 1]
and w′(N) = 1. For the existence of a normalized representation we remark that not all weights can be equal to
zero, since ∅ is a losing coalition.
A special class of simple games are so-called symmetric games, where all players have equivalent capabilities.
All these games are weighted and can be parametrized as [qˆ; 1, . . . , 1], where qˆ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The Nakamura
number for these games is well known, see e.g. [Ferejohn and Grether, 1974, Nakamura, 1979, Peleg, 1978]:
(1) ν([qˆ, 1, . . . , 1]) =
⌈
n
n− qˆ
⌉
,
where we set n0 =∞.
For the connection between the properties proper, strong or constant-sum and the quota of a weighted voting
game we refer the interested reader to e.g. [Kurz, 2014]:
(1) A weighted game is proper if and only if it admits a normalized weighted representation with q′ ∈ ( 12 , 1].
(2) A weighted game is strong if and only if it admits a normalized weighted representation with q′ ∈ (0, 12 ].
(3) A weighted game is constant-sum if and only if there exists a ε > 0 such that for all q′ ∈ ( 12 − ε, 12 + ε),
there exists a normalized weighted representation with quota q′.
Lemma 14. If ν(N,W) = n for a simple game, then (N,W) = [n− 1; 1, . . . , 1].
Proof. Assume that (N,W) contains a minimal winning coalition S of cardinality at most n − 2. Then, we can
apply Corollary 3 and deduce ν(N,W) ≤ 1 + |S| ≤ n− 1. Thus, all minimal winning coalitions have cardinality
at least n− 1. If N is a minimal winning coalition, then all all players would be vetoers and ν(N,W) =∞. Thus
all minimal winning coalitions have cardinality exactly n − 1. If N\{i} is not a minimal winning coalition for an
arbitrary player i ∈ N , then player i would be a vetoer, which is impossible for ν(N,W) = n < ∞. Thus all n
coalitions of the form N\{i} are minimal winning coalitions and the statement follows. 
Each simple game (N,W) can be written as the intersection of a finite minimum number r, called its dimension,
of weighted voting games. Directly from Lemma 10 we conclude2:
Corollary 4. Let (N,Wi) be simple games for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and (N,W) be the simple game arising as the intersection
of the (N,Wi), i.e.,W = ∩1≤i≤rWi. Then we have ν(N,W) ≥ ν(N,Wi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
2Since the intersection of simple games with the same grand coalition is a simple game too, we can state the result slightly more general.
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Similarly each simple game can be written as a union of a finite number r of weighted voting games. The smallest
possible value r is called co-dimension of the game by some authors, see e.g. [Freixas and Marciniak, 2009]. Again
the union of simple game with the same grand coalition is a simple game.
Corollary 5. Let (N,Wi) be simple games for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and (N,W) be the simple game arising as the union of
the (N,Wi), i.e.,W = ∪1≤i≤rWi. Then we have ν(N,W) ≤ ν(N,Wi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
For weighted games we can improve on the lower bound of Lemma 6:
Lemma 15. For each weighted game we have ν([q;w1, . . . , wn], N) ≥
⌈
w(N)
w(N)−q
⌉
.
Proof. Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 6 we set r = ν(N,W) and choose r winning coalitions S1, . . . , Sr
with empty intersection. With I0 := N we recursively set Ii := Ii−1 ∩ Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ r. By induction we prove
w(Ii) ≥ w(N) − i · (w(N) − q) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ r. The statement is true for I0 by definition. For i ≥ 1 we have
w(Ii−1) ≥ w(N) − (i − 1) · (w(N) − q). Since w(Si) ≥ q we have w(Ii−1 ∩ Si) ≥ w(Ii−1) − (w(N) − q) =
w(N)− i · (w(N)− q). Thus we have ν([q;w1, . . . , wn]) ≥
⌈
w(N)
w(N)−q
⌉
. 
Corollary 6. ν([q′;w′1, . . . , w′n], N) ≥
⌈
1
1−q′
⌉
We remark that one can use the freedom in choosing the representation of a weighted game to eventually improve
the lower bound obtained by Lemma 15. For the representation [2; 1, 1, 1] we obtain ν([2; 1, 1, 1]) ≥
⌈
3
3−2
⌉
= 3.
Since the same game is also represented by [1 + ε; 1, 1, 1] for all 0 < ε ≤ 12 , we could also deduce ν([2; 1, 1, 1]) ≥⌈
3
3−1−ε
⌉
= 2, which is a worser bound. The tightest possible bound is attained if the relative quota is maximized.
Using the greedy type approach, based on weights instead of cardinality, to construct a list winning coalitions
with empty intersection we obtain:
Lemma 16. ν([qˆ; wˆ1, . . . , wˆn], N) ≤ wˆ(N)wˆ(N)−qˆ−wˆ1+1 , where we assume wˆ1 ≥ wˆi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. Starting with R0 = ∅ we recursively construct winning coalitions Si by setting Si = Ri−1 and adding
players from N\Ri−1 to Si until wˆ(Si) ≥ qˆ. By construction we cannot guarantee that Si is a minimal winning
coalition, but that Si is a winning coalition with wˆ(Si) ≤ qˆ + wˆ1 − 1. With this we set Ri = Ri−1 ∩ Si and prove
wˆ(Ri) ≤ max(0, wˆ(N)− i · (wˆ(N)− qˆ − wˆ1 + 1)). Due to Lemma 8 we can assume that our weighted game
does not contain null players, i.e., we especially have wˆi ≥ 1 so that wˆ(Ri) = 0 implies Ri = ∅. Thus, we obtain
the stated upper bound. 
Corollary 7. ν([q′;w′1, . . . , w′n], N) ≤
⌈
1
1−q′−ω
⌉
, where w′i ≤ ω for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We remark for the special case of wˆi ≤ 1, i.e. wˆi ∈ {0, 1}, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the lower bound of Lemma 15 and
the upper bound of Lemma 16 coincide, which is the null player extension of Equation (1) again.
While Lemma 3 characterizes several cases where the Nakamura number is equal to 2, in general it is an NP-hard
problem to decide whether this is the case for weighted games.
Lemma 17. The computational problem to decide whether ν([q;w1, . . . , wn], N) = 2 is NP-hard.
Proof. We will provide a reduction to the NP-hard partition problem. So for integers w1, . . . , wn we have to
decide whether there exists a subset S ⊆ N such that ∑i∈S wi = ∑i∈N\S wi, where we use the abbreviation
N = {1, . . . , n}. Consider the weighted game [w(N)/2;w1, . . . , wn]. It has Nakamura number 2 if and only if a
subset S with w(S) = w(N\S) exists. 
There exists a relaxation of the notion of a weighted game.
Definition 5. A simple game (N,W) is α-roughly weighted, where α ≥ 1, if there exist non-negative weights
w1, . . . , wn such that each winning coalition S has a weight w(S) of at least 1 and each losing coalition T has a
weight of at most α.
1-roughly weighted games are also called roughly weighted games in the literature.
Lemma 18. Let (N,W) be a simple game with α-roughly representation (w1, . . . , wn). Then we have ν(N,W) ≥⌈
w(N)
w(N)−1
⌉
.
Proof. We can repeat the argumentation of the proof of Lemma 6 in this situation. 
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Note that for w(N) ≥ 2 Lemma 18 is equivalent to ν(N,W) ≥ 2. For w(N) = 1 Lemma 18 states ν(N,W) ≥
∞, i.e., this can happen if and only if there exists a dictator in (N,W). So, the only interesting case, for which⌈
w(N)
w(N)−1
⌉
≥ 3, is achieved for 1 < w(N) < 2. Assuming α < w(N), which is always possible by eventually
decreasing α to the maximum weight of a losing coalition, we have w(N)w(N)−1 <
α
α−1 .
Lemma 19. Let (N,W) be a simple game withα-roughly representation (w1, . . . , wn) and ω = max{wi | i ∈ N}.
If α+ ω > w(N), then then we have ν(N,W) ≤
⌈
w(N)
w(N)−α−ω
⌉
.
Proof. We can proceed similarly as in the proof of Lemma 16. In order to construct winning coalitions Si with
empty intersection we set Si = Ri−1 and add players from N\Ri−1 until Si becomes a winning coalition. We
remark w(Si) ≤ α+ ω so that we can conclude the proposed statement. 
Of course an α-roughly weighted game is α′-roughly weighted for all α′ ≥ α. The minimum possible value of α,
such that a given simple game, is α-roughly weighted is called critical threshold value in [Freixas and Kurz, 2014a].
Taking the critical threshold value gives the tightest upper bound.
The proofs of Lemma 15, Lemma 16 and the corresponding greedy-type heuristic suggest that weighted rep-
resentations where all minimal winning coalitions have the same weight, equaling the quota, might have a good
chance to meet the lower bound from Lemma 15. Those representations are called homogeneous representations
and the corresponding games are called, whenever such a representation exists, homogeneous games.
Example 1. The weighted voting game (N,W) = [90; 910, 24, 12] is homogeneous since all minimal winning
coalitions have weight 90. The lower bound of Lemma 15 gives ν(N,W) ≥
⌈
100
100−90
⌉
= 10. In order to determine
the exact Nakamura number of this game we study its minimal winning coalitions. To this end let S be a minimal
winning coalition. If S contains a player of weight 2, then it has to contain all players of weight 2, one player of
weight 1, and nine players of weight 9. If S contains a player of weight 1, then the other player of weight 1 is not
contained and S has to contain all players of weight 2 and nine players of weight 9. If S contains neither a player
of weight 1 not a player of weight 2, then S consists of all players of weight 9. Now we are ready to prove that
the Nakamura number of (N,W) equals 11. Let S1, . . . , Sr be a minimal collection of minimal winning coalitions
whose intersection is empty. Clearly all coalitions are pairwise different. Since there has to be a coalition where
not all players of weight 2 are present, say S1, one coalition has to consist of all players of weight 9. Since each
minimal winning coalition contains at least nine players of weight 9, we need 10 coalitions, where each of the
players of weight 9 is missing once. Thus ν(N,W) ≥ 11 and indeed one can easily state a collection of 11 minimal
winning coalitions with empty intersection.
The previous example can be generalized by choosing an integer k ≥ 3 and considering the weighted game
[k(k+1); kk+1, 2l, 1k+1−2l], where 1 ≤ l ≤ bk/2c is arbitrary. The lower bound from Lemma 15 gives ν(N,W) ≥
k + 1, while ν(N,W) = k + 2.
Next we want to study a another subclass of simple games and superclass of weighted games.
Definition 6. Let (N, v) be a simple game. We write i A j (or j @ i) for two agents i, j ∈ N if we have
v
(
{i} ∪ S\{j}
)
≥ v(S) for all {j} ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i} and we abbreviate i A j, j A i by ij.
The relation  partitions the set of players N into equivalence classes N1, . . . , Nt.
Example 2. For the weighted game [4; 5, 4, 2, 2, 0] we have N1 = {1, 2}, N2 = {3, 4}, and N3 = {5}.
Obviously, players having the same weight are contained in the same equivalence class, while the converse is
not necessarily true. But there always exists a different weighted representation of the same game such that the
players of each equivalence class have the same weight. For Example 2, such a representation is e.g. given by
[2; 2, 2, 1, 1, 0].
Definition 7. A simple game (N,W) is called complete if the binary relation A is a total preorder, i.e.,
(1) i A i for all i ∈ N ,
(2) i A j or j A i for all i, j ∈ N , and
(3) i A j, j A h implies i A h for all i, j, h ∈ N .
All weighted games are obviously complete sincewi ≥ wj implies i A j. For the weighted game [7; 3, 3, 3, 1, 1, 1]
the minimal winning coalitions are given by {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 2, 5}, {1, 2, 6}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 3, 6},
{2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, and {2, 3, 6}. Based on the equivalence classes of players one can state a more compact de-
scription.
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Definition 8. Let (N,W) be a simple game with equivalence classes N1, . . . , Nt. A coalition vector is a vector
c = (c1, . . . , ct) ∈ Nt≥0 with 0 ≤ ci ≤ |Ni| for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. The coalition vector of a coalition S is given
by (|S ∩N1| , . . . , |S ∩Nt|). A coalition vector is called winning if the corresponding coalitions are winning and
losing otherwise. If the corresponding coalitions are minimal winning or maximal losing the coalition vector itself
is called minimal winning or maximal losing.
In our previous example the minimal winning (coalition) vectors are given by (3, 0) and (2, 1), where N1 =
{1, 2, 3} and N2 = {4, 5, 6}.
Using the concept of coalition vectors the ILP from Corollary 2 can be simplified:
Lemma 20. Let (N,W) be a simple game without vetoers and N1, . . . , Nt be its decomposition into equivalence
classes. Using the abbreviations nj = |Nj | for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t and V ⊆ Nt≥0 for the set of minimal winning coalition
vectors, the Nakamura number of (N,W) is given as the optimal target value of:
min
∑
v∈V
xv∑
v=(v1,...,vt)∈V
(nj − vj) · xv ≥ nj ∀1 ≤ j ≤ t
xv ∈ Z≥0 ∀v ∈ V
Proof. At first we show that each collection S1, . . . , Sr of minimal winning coalitions with empty intersection can
be mapped onto a feasible, not necessarily optimal, solution of the above ILP with target value r.
Each minimal winning coalition Si has a minimal winning coalition vector vi. We set xv to the number of times
vector v is the corresponding winning coalition vector. So the xv are non-negative integers and the target value
clearly coincides with r. The term
|Nj | − |Si −Nj |
counts the number of players of type j which are missing in coalition Si. Since every player has to be dropped at
least once from a winning coalition, we have
r∑
i=1
nj − |Si −Nj | ≥ nj
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t. The number on the left hand side is also counted by∑
v=(v1,...,vt)∈V
(nj − vj) · xv,
so that all inequalities are satisfied.
For the other direction we chose r vectors v1, . . . , vr ∈ V such that ∑ri=1 vi = ∑v∈V xv · v, i.e. we take xv
copies of vector v for each v ∈ V , where r = ∑v∈V xv . In order to construct corresponding minimal winning
coalitions S1, . . . , Sr, we decompose those desired coalitions according to the equivalence classes of players: Si =
∪Sij with Sij ⊆ Nj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
For an arbitrary by fix index 1 ≤ j ≤ t we start with R0 = Nj and recursively construct the sets Sij as
follows: Starting from i = 1 we set Sij = Nj\Ri−1 and Ri = ∅ if |Ri−1| < nj − vij . Otherwise we chose a
subset U ⊆ Ri−1 of cardinality nj − vij and set Sij = Nj\U and Ri = Ri−1\U . For each 1 ≤ i ≤ r we have
Nj\ ∩1≤h≤i Sij = Nj\Ri.
By construction, the coalition vector of Si is component-wise larger or equal to vi, i.e. the Si are winning
coalitions. Since
∑r
i=1
(
nj − vij
) ≥ nj , we have Ri = ∅ in all cases, i.e. the intersection of the Si is empty. 
As an example, we consider the weighted game [4; 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1] with equivalence classes N1 = {1, 2}, N2 =
{3, 4, 5, 6} and minimal winning coalition vectors (2, 0), (1, 2), and (0, 4). The corresponding ILP reads:
minx(2,0) + x(1,2) + x(0,4)
0 · x(2,0) + 1 · x(1,2) + 2 · x(0,4) ≥ 2
4 · x(2,0) + 2 · x(1,2) + 0 · x(0,4) ≥ 4
x(2,0), x(1,2), x(0,4) ∈ Z≥0
Solutions with the optimal target value of 2 are given by x(2,0) = 1, x(1,2) = 0, x(0,4) = 1 and x(2,0) = 0,
x(1,2) = 2, x(0,4) = 0. For the first solution we have v1 = (2, 0) and v2 = (0, 4) so that S11 = {1, 2}, S21 = ∅,
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S12 = ∅ and S22 = {3, 4, 5, 6}, where we have always chosen the players with the smallest index. For the second
solution we have v1 = (1, 2) and v2 = (1, 2) so that S11 = {1}, S21 = {2}, S12 = {3, 4} and S22 = {5, 6}.
Definition 9. For two vectors u, v ∈ Nt≥0 we write u  v if
∑i
j=1 uj ≤
∑i
j=1 vj for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. If neither
u  v nor v  u, we write u ./ v. We call a winning coalition vector u shift-minimal winning if all coalition
vectors v  u, v 6= u (v ≺ u for short) are losing. Similarly, we call a losing vector u shift-maximal losing if all
coalition vectors v  u are winning.
In our previous example (2, 1) is shift-minimal winning and (3, 0) is not shift-minimal winning, since one player
of type 1 can be shifted to be of type 2 without losing the property of being a winning vector. Complete simple
games are uniquely characterized by their count vectors n˜ = (|N1| , . . . , |Nt|) and their matrix M˜ of shift-minimal
winning vectors. In our example we have n˜ = (3, 3), M˜ =
(
2 1
)
. The corresponding matrix of shift-maximal
losing vectors is given by L˜ =
(
2 0
1 3
)
. By m˜1, . . . , m˜r we denote the shift-minimal winning vectors, i.e. the rows
of M˜ .
The crucial characterization theorem for complete simple games using vectors as coalitions and the partial or-
der  was given in [Carreras and Freixas, 1996]:
Theorem 1.
(a) Given are a vector
n˜ =
(
n1 . . . nt
) ∈ Nt>0
and a matrix
M =

m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
m2,1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
. . .
. . .
...
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t
 =

m˜1
m˜2
...
m˜r

satisfying the following properties
(i) 0 ≤ mi,j ≤ nj , mi,j ∈ N for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, 1 ≤ j ≤ t,
(ii) m˜i ./ m˜j for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ r,
(iii) for each 1 ≤ j < t there is at least one row-index i such that mi,j > 0, mi,j+1 < nj+1 if t > 1 and
m1,1 > 0 if t = 1, and
(iv) m˜i m m˜i+1 for 1 ≤ i < r, where m denotes the lexicographical order.
Then, there exists a complete simple game (N,χ) associated to (n˜,M).
(b) Two complete simple games (n˜1,M1) and (n˜2,M2) are isomorphic if and only if n˜1 = n˜2 andM1 =
M2.
Shift-minimal winning coalitions are coalitions whose coalition vector is shift-minimal winning. For shift-
minimal winning coalitions an analogue lemma like Lemma 1 for minimal winning coalitions does not exist in
general. As an example consider the complete simple game uniquely characterized by n˜ = (5, 5) and M˜ =(
2 3
)
. Here we need three copies of the coalition vector (2, 3) since 2 · (n˜ − (2, 3)) = (6, 4) 6≥ (5, 5) = n˜ but
3 · (n˜ − (2, 3)) ≥ n˜. On the other hand the Nakamura number is indeed 2 as one can choose the two minimal
winning vectors (2, 3) and (3, 2), where the later is a shifted version of (2, 3).
Definition 10. Given a vector u ∈ Nt≥0 the vector v =
∑
(u) ∈ Nt≥0 is given by vi =
∑i
j=1 uj for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Directly from Definition 9 and Definition 10 we conclude:
Lemma 21. Let v ∈ Nt≥0 be a minimal winning vector of a complete simple game (N,W). If v  u, then u is also
a winning vector and
∑
(v) ≤∑(u).
Lemma 22. For each complete simple game, uniquely characterized by n˜ and M˜ , without vetoers and equivalence
classes N1, . . . , Nt the corresponding Nakamura number ν(N,W) is given as the optimal target value of
min
r∑
i=1
xi
r∑
i=1
(
oj − pij
) · xi ≥ oj ∀1 ≤ j ≤ t
xi ∈ Z≥0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ r,
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where o := (o1, . . . , ot) =
∑
(n˜), pi :=
(
pi1, . . . , p
i
t
)
=
∑
(m˜i), and nj = |Nj |.
Proof. Consider a list of minimal winning vectors v1, . . . , vr corresponding to an optimal solution of Lemma 20.
We aim to construct a solution of the present ILP. To this end consider an arbitrary mapping τ from the set of
minimal winning vectors into the set of shift-minimal winning vectors, such that τ(u)  u for all minimal winning
vectors u. We choose the xi’s as the number of occurrences of m˜i = τ(vj) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ j. Thus, the xi are
non-negative numbers, which sum to the Nakamura number of the given complete game. Since τ(vi)  vi we
have
∑
(τ(vi)) ≤∑(vi) due to Lemma 21. Thus∑(n˜)−∑(τ(vi)) ≥∑(n˜)−∑(vi) so that all inequalities are
satisfied.
For the other direction let xi be a solution of the present ILP. Choosing xi copies of shift-minimal winning
vector m˜i we obtain a list of shift-minimal winning vectors v10 , . . . , v
r
0 satisfying
∑r
i=1
∑
(n˜) −∑(vi0) ≥∑(n˜).
Starting with j = 1 we iterate: As long we do not have
∑r
i=1 n˜− vij ≥ n˜, we choose an index 1 ≤ h ≤ t where the
hth component of
∑r
i=1 n˜ − vij is smaller then n˜h. Since
∑r
i=1
∑
(n˜) −∑(vij) ≥∑(n˜) we have h ≥ 2 and the
(h− 1)th component of∑ri=1∑(n˜)−∑(vij) is at least one larger than the (h− 1)th component of∑(n˜). Thus
there exists a vector vi
′
j where we can shift one player from class h to a class with index lower or equal than h− 1
to obtain a new minimal winning vector vi
′
j+1. All other vectors remain unchanged. We can easily check, that the
new list of minimal winning vectors also satisfies
∑r
i=1
∑
(n˜)−∑(vij+1) ≥∑(n˜). Since∑ri=1∑(n˜)−∑(vij)
decreases one unit in a component in each iteration the process must terminate. Thus finally we end up with a list
of minimal winning vectors satisfying
∑r
i=1 n˜− vij ≥ n˜. 
In Figure 1 we have depicted the Hasse diagram of the shift-relation for coalition vectors for n˜ = (1, 2, 1). If we
consider the complete simple game with shift-minimal winning vectors (1, 0, 1) and (0, 2, 0), then for the minimal
winning vector (1, 1, 0) we have two possibilities for τ .
As an example we consider the complete simple game uniquely characterized by n˜ = (10, 10) and M˜ =
(
7 8
)
.
An optimal solution of the corresponding ILP is given by x1 = 4. I.e. initially we have v10 = (7, 8), v
2
0 = (7, 8),
v30 = (7, 8), and v
4
0 = (7, 8). We have
∑r
i=1
∑
(n˜)−∑(vi0) = (12, 20) ≥ (10, 20) = ∑(n˜) and∑ri=1 n˜− vi0 =
(12, 8) 6≥ (10, 10) = n˜. Here the second component, with value 8, is too small. Thus the first component must be at
least 1 too large, and indeed 12 > 10. We can shift one player from class 2 to class 1. We may choose v11 = (8, 7),
v21 = (7, 8), v
3
1 = (7, 8), and v
4
1 = (7, 8), so that
∑r
i=1
∑
(n˜) −∑(v10) = (11, 20) ≥ (10, 20) = ∑(n˜) and∑r
i=1 n˜ − vi0 = (11, 9) 6≥ (10, 10) = n˜. Finally we may shift one player in v11 again or in any of the three other
vectors to obtain v′2 = v
2
2 = (7, 8) and v
3
2 = v
4
2 = (8, 7).
FIGURE 1. The Hasse diagram of the vectors with counting vector (1, 2, 1).
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Lemma 23. A complete simple game (N,W) uniquely characterized by its count vector n˜ and its matrix M˜ =
(m˜1, . . . , m˜r)T contains vetoers if and only if m˜i1 = n˜1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
The next two lemmas and Lemma 27 concern complete simple games with minimum, i.e., with a unique minimal
winning vector in M˜ .
Lemma 24. The Nakamura number of a complete simple game uniquely characterized by n˜ = (n1, . . . , nt) and
M˜ =
(
m11 . . . m
1
t
)
is given by
max
1≤i≤t
⌈ ∑i
j=1 nj∑i
j=1 nj −m1j
⌉
.
Proof. We utilize the ILP in Lemma 22. In our situation it has only one variable x1. The minimal integer satisfying
the inequality number i is given by
⌈ ∑i
j=1 nj∑i
j=1 nj−m1j
⌉
. 
We remark that the above Lemma remains true in the case of vetoers due to m11 = n1 according to Lemma 23.
Just knowing the sizes of the equivalence classes of players gives the following upper bound.
Lemma 25. The Nakamura number of a complete simple game without vetoers uniquely characterized by n˜ =
(n1, . . . , nt) and M˜ =
(
m11 . . . m
1
t
)
is upper bounded by
max
1≤i≤t
⌈∑i
j=1 nj
i
⌉
.
Proof. Since the complete simple game has no vetoers we have m11 ≤ n1 − 1. Due to the type conditions in the
parameterization theorem of complete simple games, we have 1 ≤ m1j ≤ nj − 1 and nj ≥ 2 for all 2 ≤ j ≤ t− 1.
If t ≥ 2 then we additionally have 0 ≤ m1t ≤ nt − 1 and nt ≥ 1. Thus we have
∑i
j=1 nj −m1j ≥ i and conclude
the proposed upper bound from Lemma 24. 
Observe that the previous upper bound is tight when ni = 2 for each 1 ≤ i ≤ t since the only game with such n˜
is improper. For the remaining n˜ vectors both the upper bound and the trivial lower bound 2 are tight.
Lemma 26. Let (N,W) be a complete simple game with t types of players. If (n1 − 1, . . . , nt − 1) is a winning
vector, then we have
ν(N,W) ≤ max
1≤i≤t
⌈∑i
j=1 nj
i
⌉
≤ n− t+ 1
Proof. Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 24 yields the first bound. The second bound follows from
n1 + · · ·+ ni
i
≤ n− t+ i
i
=
n− t
i
+ 1 ≤ n− t+ 1.

Lemma 27. The Nakamura number of a complete simple game without vetoers uniquely characterized by n˜ =
(n1, . . . , nt) and M˜ =
(
m11 . . . m
1
t
)
is upper bounded by max(2, n− 2t+ 3).
Proof. By shifting one player from Ni to Ni−1 the upper bound from Lemma 25 does not decrease. Thus the
minimum is attained at nt = 1, and ni = 2 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ t− 1. 
The example with the unique shift-minimal winning vector (n1 − 1, 1, . . . , 1, 0) shows that the stated bound is
sharp.
Using the argument of Lemma 24 as a heuristic, i.e. using just a single shift-minimal winning vector, we obtain:
Lemma 28. The Nakamura number of a complete simple game uniquely characterized by n˜ = (n1, . . . , nt) and
M˜ = (m1, . . . ,mr)T , where mi = (mi1, . . . ,m
i
t), is upper bounded by
max
1≤i≤t
⌈ ∑i
j=1 nj∑i
j=1 nj −mij
⌉
.
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
I.e., we may take the minimal upper bound over all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, cf. Corollary 5.
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4. MAXIMUM NAKAMURA NUMBERS WITHIN SUBCLASSES OF SIMPLE GAMES
By S we denote the set of simple games, by C we denote the set of complete simple games, and by T we denote
the set of weighted games.
Definition 11. NakX (n, t) is the maximum Nakamura number of a game with n ≥ 2 player and t ≤ n equivalence
classes in X , where X ∈ {S, C, T }, without vetoers.
Clearly, we have
2 ≤ NakT (n, t) ≤ NakC(n, t) ≤ NakS(n, t) ≤ n,
if the corresponding set of games is non-empty.
Lemma 29. For n ≥ 2 we have NakT (n, 1) = NakC(n, 1) = NakS(n, 1) = n.
Proof. Consider the example [n− 1; 1, . . . , 1] with n players of weight 1. 
Lemma 30. For n ≥ 3 we have NakT (n, 2) = NakC(n, 2) = NakS(n, 2) = n− 1.
Proof. Consider the example [n − 1; 1, . . . , 1, 0] with n − 1 players of weight 1. Thus NakT (n, 2) ≥ n − 1. By
using Lemma 14 we conclude NakS(n, 2) ≤ n− 1, so that we obtain the stated result. 
We remark that each simple game with two non-equivalent players achieving the maximum Nakamura number
contains a vetoer and a null player.
Lemma 31. For n ≥ 4 we have NakT (n, 3) = NakC(n, 3) = NakS(n, 3) = n− 1.
Proof. Consider the example [5n − 2k − 9; 5n−k−1, 3k, 11], where k ≥ 2 and n − k − 1 ≥ 1, i.e. n ≥ k + 2 and
n ≥ 4, with n − k − 1 players of weight 5, k players of weight 3, and one player of weight 1 – this is indeed the
minimum integer representation, so that we really have 3 types of players (this may also be checked directly).
Let S be a minimal winning coalition. If a player of weight 5 is missing in S, then all players of weight 3 and
the player of weight 1 belong to S. Thus, we need n− k − 1 such versions in order to get an empty intersection of
winning coalitions. If a player of weight 3 is missing, then all of the remaining players of weight 3 and all players
of weight 5 have to be present, so that we need k such versions. Thus the game has Nakamura number n− 1 for all
n ≥ 4 (if k is chosen properly). Using Lemma 14 we conclude NakS(n, 3) ≤ n − 1, so that we obtain the stated
result.

We remark that for n ≤ 3 there exists no weighted (or simple) game with t = 3 types. Similarly for n ≤ 4
there exists no weighted game with t = 4 types. In our example we have freedom to distribute the players almost
arbitrarily between the first two types of players, i.e., there are examples where two classes of types of players are
large, i.e. there is little hope to get too many restrictions on the set of extremal examples.
As a follow-up to Lemma 14 we now want to classify all simple games with Nakamura number n− 1.
Lemma 32. Let (N,W) be a simple game with ν(N,W) = n− 1, then (N,W) is of one of the following types:
(1) (N,W) = [2n− 4); 2n−2,1 2], t = 2, for all n ≥ 3;
(2) (N,W) = [1; 13], t = 1, for all n = 3;
(3) (N,W) = [2n− 5; 2n−3, 13], t = 2, for all n ≥ 4;
(4) (N,W) = [n− 1; 1n−1, 0], t = 2, for all n ≥ 3;
(5) (N,W) = [5n− 2k − 9; 5n−k−1, 3k, 11], t = 3, for all n ≥ 4 (2 ≤ k ≤ n− 2);
Proof. Since ν(N,W) = n − 1 the game does not contain veto players and all coalitions without one player,
i.e. N\{i}, are winning. Due to Lemma 11 all coalitions missing at least three players have to be losing, since
otherwise ν(N,W) ≤ n − 2. So, we can describe the game as a graph by taking N as the set of vertices and by
taking edge {i, j} if and only if N\{i, j} is a winning coalition. Again by using Lemma 11 we conclude that each
two edges need to have a vertex in common. Thus our graph consists of isolated vertices and either a triangle or a
star. To be more precise, we consider the following cases:
• only isolated vertices, which is the case of Lemma 14 and thus excluded;
• a single edge: this does not correspond to a simple game since the empty coalition has to be losing;
• a single edge and at least one isolated vertex: this is case (1);
• a triangle: this is case (2);
• a triangle and at least one isolated vertex: this is case (3);
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• a star (with at least three vertices) and no isolated vertex: this is case (4);
• a star (with at least three vertices) and at least one isolated vertex: this is case (5).

Lemma 33. For n ≥ 5 we have NakT (n, 4) = NakC(n, 4) = NakS(n, 4) = n− 2.
Proof. We append a null player to the stated extremal example for three types of players considered in the proof of
Lemma 31, i.e., we consider the weighted game [5n− 2k− 9; 5n−k−2, 3k, 11, 01], where k ≥ 2 and n−k− 2 ≥ 1,
which is possible for n ≥ 5 players. Due to Lemma 8 it has a Nakamura number of n − 2, so that NakT (n, 4) ≥
n − 2. From the classification in Lemma 32 we conclude NakS(n, 4) ≤ n − 2, so that the proposed equations
follow. 
Conjecture 1. If n is sufficiently large, then we have n− t+ 1 ≤ NakT (n, t) ≤ n− t+ 2, where t ∈ N>0.
For simple games we can obtain tighter bounds.
Lemma 34. For n ≥ t and t ≥ 6 we have NakS(n, t) ≥ n− ⌊ t−12 ⌋.
Proof. Consider a simple game with t types of players given by the following list of minimal winning vectors:
(n1 − 1, n2, . . . , nt)
(n1, n2 − 1, n3 − 1, n4, . . . , nt)
(n1, n2, n3 − 1, n4 − 1, n5, . . . , nt)
...
(n1, n2, . . . , nt−2, nt−1 − 1, nt − 1)
(n1, n2 − 1, n3, . . . , nt−1, nt − 1),
i.e., if a player of class 1 is missing, then all other players have to be present in a winning coalition, no two players
of the same type can be missing in a winning coalition, and at most two players can be missing in a winning vector,
if they come from neighbored classes (where the classes 2, 3, . . . , t are arranged on a circle).
At first we check that this game has in fact t types. Obviously class 1 is different from the other ones. Let i, j
be two different indices in {2, 3, . . . , t}. Since the circle has length at least five, on one side there are at least two
vertices, say a and b, between i and j. Assume further that a is neighbored to i, but not to j, and b is neighbored
to j, but not to i. Then exchanging i and j turns the type of the coalition with two players missing from {i, a} and
{j, b}.
With respect to the Nakamura number we remark that we have to choose n1 coalitions of the form (n1 −
1, n2, . . . , nt). All other coalitions exclude 2 players, so that we need
⌈
n2+···+nt
2
⌉
of these. Taking n2 = · · · =
nt = 1 gives the proposed bound. 
Lemma 35. Let k ≥ 3 be an integer. For 2k + 1 ≤ t ≤ k + 2k and n ≥ t we have NakS(n, t) ≥ n− k.
Proof. Let V be an arbitrary k-element subset of N . Let U1, . . . , Ut−k−1 be disjoint subsets of V containing all
k one-element subsets and the empty subset. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t − l − 1 we choose a distinct vertex vi in N\V .
We define the game by specifying the set of winning coalitions as follows: The grand coalition and all coalitions
N\{j} of cardinality n − 1 are winning. Coalition N\V and all of its supersets are winning. Additionally the
following coalitions of cardinality n − 2 are winning: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ t − l − 1 and all u ∈ Ui the coalition
N\{v, u} is winning.
We can now check that the k players in V are of k different types, where each equivalence class contains exactly
one player (this is due to the one element subsets Ui of V ). Vertices vi also form their own equivalence class,
consisting of exactly one player - except for the case of Ui = ∅, here all remaining players are pooled. Thus we
have 2k + 1 ≤ t ≤ k + 2k types of players.
Suppose we are given a list S1, . . . , Sl of winning coalitions with empty intersection, then |N\(Si\V )| = 1, i.e.
every winning coalition can miss at most one player from N\V . Thus the Nakamura number is at least n− k. 
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5. FURTHER RELATIONS FOR THE NAKAMURA NUMBER
As we have already remarked, the lower bound of Lemma 15 can be strengthened if we maximize the quota, i.e.
solve
max q
w(S) ≥ q ∀S ∈ W
w(T ) < q ∀T ∈ L
w(N) = 1
wi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n
Looking at the proof of Lemma 15 again, we observe that our lower bound can eventually by further strengthened
if we drop the condition on the losing coalitions, which are not used in the proof of the lower bound. So we consider
the linear program
max q
w(S) ≥ q ∀S ∈ W
w(N) = 1
wi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,
which has the same set of optimal solutions, except for the target value, as
min 1− q
w(S) ≥ q ∀S ∈ W
w(N) = 1
wi ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Here the optimal value 1− q is also called the minimum maximum excess e?, which arises in the determination of
the nucleolus. We remark that, for an arbitrary simple game, e? equals 1 if and only if the game contains a vetoer.
Corollary 8. Let e? be the minimum maximum excess of a simple game (N,W), then we have ν(N,W) ≥ ⌈ 1e? ⌉.
Dividing the target function by q > 0 and replacing wi = w′iq, which is a monotone transform, we obtain that
the set of the optimal solutions of the previous LP is the same as the one of:
min
1− q
q
=
1
q
− 1
w′(S) ≥ 1 ∀S ∈ W
w′(N) =
1
q
w′i ≥ 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n,
If we now set ∆ := 1q − 1 and add ∆ ≥ 0, we obtain the definition of the price of stability for games where the
grand coalition is winning, see e.g. [Bachrach et al., 2009].
Corollary 9. Let ∆ be the price of stability of a simple game (N,W), then we have ν(N,W) ≥ ⌈ 1+∆∆ ⌉.
We remark that we have ∆ = e
∗
1−e? = 0 if and only if the game contains a vetoer. So one can say, that the
Nakamura number is large if the price of stability is low.
It seems that Corollary 8 is the tightest and most applicable lower bound that we have at hand for the Nakamura
number of a simple game. An interesting question is to study under what conditions it attains the exact value.
Here we want to focus on the easier subcase of weighted games, where the lower bound of Lemma 15 and Corol-
lary 8 coincides. This happens e.g. for homogeneous representations. It is well known that one can homogenize
each weighted game with integer weights by adding a sufficiently large number of players of weight 1.
Lemma 36. Let w1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn ≥ 2 be integer weights with sum Ω =
∑n
i=1 wi and q ∈ (0, 1) be a rational
number. For each positive integer r we consider the game
χ = [q · (Ω + r);w1, . . . , wn, 1r] ,
with r players of weight 1. If r ≥ max
(
Ω, 2+w11−q
)
we have ν(χ,N) =
⌈
1
1−qr
⌉
, where qr = dq(Ω+r)eΩ+r .
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Proof. At first we remark that χ = [dq · (Ω + r)e ;w1, . . . , wn, 1r], so that the proposed exact value coincides with
the lower bound from Lemma 15. Next we observe
qr =
dq(Ω + r)e
Ω + r
≤ 1 + q(Ω + r)
Ω + r
= q +
1
Ω + r
≤ q + 1
r
.
Consider the following greedy way of constructing the list S1, . . . , Sk of winning coalitions with empty intersection.
Starting with i = 1 and h = 1 we choose an index h ≤ g ≤ n such that Ui = {h, h + 1, . . . , g} has a weight of a
most (1 − qr)(Ω + r) and either g = n or Ui ∪ {g + 1} has a weight larger then (1 − qr)(Ω + r). Given Ui we
set Si = {1, . . . , n + r}\Ui, h = g + 1, and increase i by one. If (1 − qr)(Ω + r) ≥ wi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then
no player in {1, . . . , n} has a too large weight to be dropped in this manner. Since we assume the weights to be
ordered, it suffices to check the proposed inequality for w1. To this end we consider
(1− qr)(Ω + r) ≥
(
1− q − 1
r
)
· (Ω + r) = (1− q)Ω− 1− Ω
r
+ (1− q)r ≥ (1− q)r − 2,
where we have used r ≥ Ω. Since r ≥ 2+w11−q ≥ 2+wi1−q the requested inequality is satisfied.
So far the winning coalitions Si can have weights larger then qr(Ω + r) and their intersection is given by the
players of weight 1, i.e. by {n+ 1, . . . , n+ r}. For all 1 ≤ i < k let hi be the player with the smallest index in Ui,
which is indeed one of the heaviest players in this subset. With this we conclude w(Si) ≤ qr(Ω+r)+whi−1 since
otherwise another player from Ui+1 could have been added. In order to lower the weights of the Si to qr(Ω+ r) we
remove w(Si)− (qr(Ω + r))) players of Si for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, starting from player n+ 1 and removing each player
exactly once. Since
∑k−1
i=1 whi ≤ Ω ≤ r this is indeed possible. Now we remove the remaining, if any, players
of weight 1 from Sk until they reach weight qr(Ω + r) and eventually start new coalitions Si = {1, . . . , n + r}
removing players of weight 1. Finally we end up with r + l winning coalitions with empty intersection, where the
coalitions 1 ≤ i ≤ k+ l− 1 have weight exactly qr(Ω + r) and the sets {1, . . . , n+ r}\Si do contain only players
of weight 1 for i ≥ r + 1. Since each player is dropped exactly once the Nakamura number of the game equals
k + l =
⌈
1
1−qr
⌉
. 
Other possibilities are to consider replicas, i.e., each of the initial players is divided into k equal players all
having the initial weight, where we assume a relative quota as in the previous lemma. If no players of weight 1
are present, then the game eventually does not become homogeneous, even if the replication factor k is large. But
indeed the authors of [Kurz et al., 2014] have recently shown that for the case of a suitably large replication factor k
the nucleolus coincides with the relative weights of the players, i.e., the lower bound of Corollary 8 and Lemma 15
coincide. Here we show that for sufficiently large replication factors k the lower bound of Lemma 15 is attained
with equality.
Lemma 37. Letw1 ≥ · · · ≥ wn ≥ 1 be (not necessarily pairwise) coprime integer weights with sum Ω =
∑n
i=1 wi
and q ∈ (0, 1) be a rational number. For each positive integer r we consider the game
χ = [q · (Ω · r);wr1, . . . , wrn] ,
where each player is replicated r times. If r is sufficiently large, we have ν(χ,N) =
⌈
1
1−qr
⌉
, where qr = dq(Ω·r)eΩ·r .
Proof. We write q = pq with positive comprime integers p, q. If p 6= q − 1, then⌈
1
1− q
⌉⌈
q
q − p
⌉
>
1
1− q ,
i.e., we always round up. Obviously limr→∞ qr = q (and qr ≥ q). Since also
lim
r→∞
w(Nr)
w(Nr)− qrw(Nr)− w1 + 1 = limr→∞
w(Nr)
w(Nr)− qrw(Nr) =
1
1− q ,
we can apply the upper bound of Lemma 16 to deduce that the lower bound is attained with equality for sufficiently
large replication factors r.
In the remaining part we assume p = q − 1, i.e., 1 − q = 1q . If Ω · r is not divisible by q, i.e. qr > q, we can
apply a similar argument as before, so that we restrict ourselves to the case q|Ω · r, i.e. q = qr. Here we have to
show that the Nakamura number exactly equals q (in the previous case it equals q + 1). This is possible if we can
partition the grand coalition N into q subsets U1, . . . , Uq all having a weight of exactly Ω·rq . (The list of winning
coalitions with empty intersection is then given by Si = N\Ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ q.) This boils down to a purely number
theoretic question, which is solved in the subsequent lemma. 
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Lemma 38. Letw1, . . . , wn be positive integers with
n∑
i=1
wi = Ω and greatest common divisor gcd(w1, . . . , wn) =
1. Let further an integer q ≥ 2 be given. There exists an integer K such that for all k ≥ K, where k·Ωq ∈ N there
exist non-negative integers uij with
n∑
j=1
uij · wj =
k · Ω
q
,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ q, and
q∑
i=1
uij = k,
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Proof. For k = 1, setting uij =
1
q is an inner point of the polyhedron
P =
uij ∈ R≥0 |
n∑
j=1
uij · wj =
Ω
q
∀1 ≤ i ≤ q and
q∑
i=1
uij = 1∀1 ≤ j ≤ n
 ,
so that is has non-zero volume.
For general k ∈ N>0 we are looking for lattice points in the dilation k ·P . If q is a divisor of k ·Ω, then Znq∩k ·P
is a lattice of maximal rank in the affine space spanned by k · P . Let k0 the minimal positive integer such that q
divides k0 ·Ω. Using Erhart theory one can count the number of lattice points in the parametric rational polytope in
m · k0 · P , where m ∈ N>0, see e.g. [Beck and Robins, 2007]. To be more precise, the number of (integer) lattice
points in m · k0 ·P grows asymptotically as md vold(k0P ), where d is the dimension of the affine space A spanned
by k0 · P and vold(k0P ) is the (normalized) volume of k0 · P within A. Due to the existence of an inner point we
have vold(k0P ) > 0, so that the number of integer solutions is at least 1 for m 0. 
5.1. The Nakamura number and the one-dimensional cutting stock problem. There is a relation between the
problem of Lemma 38 and the Frobenius number, which asks for the largest integer which can not be expressed
as a non-negative integer linear combination of the wi, and which recently occurs in the context on minimum sum
integer representations, see [Freixas and Kurz, 2014b]. According to the Frobenius theorem every sufficiently large
number can be expressed as such a sum. Here we ask for several such representations which are balanced, i.e., each
coin is taken equally often.
Finally we would like to mention another relation between the Nakamura number of a weighted game and a
famous optimization problem – the one-dimensional cutting stock problem. Here, one-dimensional objects like e.g.
paper reels or wooden rods, all having length L ∈ R>0 should be cut into pieces of lengths l1, . . . , lm in order
to satisfy the corresponding order demands b1, . . . , bm ∈ Z>0. The minimization of waste is the famous 1CSP.
By possible duplicating some lengths li, we can assume bi = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, while this transformation
can increases the value of m. Using the abbreviations l = (l1, . . . , lm)T we denote an instance of 1CSP by
E = (m,L, l). The classical ILP formulation for the cutting stock problem by Gilmore and Gomory is based
on so-called cutting patterns, see [Gilmore and Gomory, 1961]. We call a pattern a ∈ {0, 1}m feasible (for E) if
l>a ≤ L. ByP (E) we denote the set of all patterns that are feasible forE. Given a set of patternsP = {a1, . . . , ar}
(of E), let A(P ) denote the concatenation of the pattern vectors ai. With this we can define
zB(P,m) :=
r∑
i=1
xi → min subject to A(P )x = 1, x ∈ {0, 1}r and
zC(P,m) :=
r∑
i=1
xi → min subject to A(P )x = 1, x ∈ [0, 1]r.
Choosing P = P (E) we obtain the mentioned ILP formulation for 1CSP of [Gilmore and Gomory, 1961] and
its continuous relaxation. Obviously we have zB(P (E),m) ≥ dzC(P (E),m)e. In cases of equality one speaks
of an IRUP (integer round-up property) instance – a concept introduced for general linear minimization problems in
[Baum and Trotter, 1981]. In practice almost all instances have the IRUP. Indeed, the authors of [Scheithauer and Terno, 1995]
have conjectured that zB(P (E),m) ≥ dzC(P (E),m)e+ 1 – called the MIRUP property, which is one of the most
important theoretical issues about 1CSP, see also [Eisenbrand et al., 2013].
Lemma 39. Let (N,W) be a strong simple game on n players, then ν(N,W) ≤ zB(L, n), where L denotes the
incidence vectors corresponding to the losing coalitions L = 2N\W ⊆ 2N .
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Proof. The value zB(L, n) corresponds to the minimal number of losing coalitions that partition the setN , which is
the same as the minimum number of (maximal) losing coalitions that cover the grand coalition N . Let L1, . . . , Lr
denote a list of losing coalitions of minimum size. Since (N,W) is strong the coalitions N\L1, . . . , N\Lr are
winning and have an empty intersection, so that ν(N,W) ≤ zB(L, n). 
There is a strong relation between the 1CSP instances and weighted games, see [Kartak et al., 2015]. For each
weighted games there exists an 1CSP instance where the feasible patterns correspond to the losing coalitions. For
the other direction the feasible patterns of a 1CSP instance correspond to the losing coalitions of a weighted game
if the all-one vector is non-feasible.
6. ENUMERATION RESULTS
In order to get a first idea of the distribution of the distribution of the attained Nakamura numbers we consider
the class of complete simple games with a unique shift-minimal winning coalition, see Table 1 and Table 2, as well
as their subclass of weighted games, see Table 3.
n ∞ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 1
2 2 1
3 4 2 1
4 8 5 1 1
5 16 9 4 1 1
6 32 19 8 2 1 1
7 64 34 18 7 2 1 1
8 128 69 36 14 4 2 1 1
9 256 125 86 24 12 4 2 1 1
10 512 251 160 60 24 8 4 2 1
11 1024 461 362 120 43 21 8 4 2
12 2048 923 724 240 86 42 16 8 4
13 4096 1715 1525 513 194 78 38 16 8
14 8192 3431 3050 1026 388 156 76 32 16
15 16384 6434 6529 2052 776 312 145 71 32
16 32768 12869 12785 4377 1517 659 290 142 64
17 65536 24309 27000 8614 3174 1318 580 276 136
18 131072 48619 54000 17228 6348 2636 1160 552 272
19 262144 92377 111434 35884 12696 5221 2371 1104 535
20 524288 184755 222868 71768 25392 10442 4742 2208 1070
21 1048576 352715 462532 142567 51468 21169 9484 4416 2140
22 2097152 705431 917312 292886 102936 42338 18898 8902 4280
23 4194304 1352077 1893410 585772 205872 84676 37796 17804 8560
24 8388608 2704155 3786820 1171544 411744 169352 75592 35608 17120
25 16777216 5200299 7738389 2379267 830572 338198 151690 71124 34332
TABLE 1. Complete simple games with minimum (r = 1) per Nakamura number – part 1
We have chosen these subclasses since they allow to exhaustively generate all corresponding games for moderate
sizes of the number of players n, which is not the case for many other subclasses of simple games. Additionally,
the corresponding Nakamura numbers can be evaluated easily applying Lemma 24.
One might say that being non-weighted increases the probability for a complete simple game with a unique
shift-minimal winning vector to have a low Nakamura number. In Table 3 the last entries of each row seem to
coincide with the sequence of natural numbers, where the number of entries increases every two rows.
7. CONCLUSION
The Nakamura number measures the degree of rationality of preference aggregation rules such as simple games
in the voting context. It indicates the extent to which the aggregation rule can yield well defined choices. If
the number of alternatives to choose from is less than this number, then the rule in question will identify “best”
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n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
10 1
11 1 1
12 2 1 1
13 4 2 1 1
14 8 4 2 1 1
15 16 8 4 2 1 1
16 32 16 8 4 2 1 1
17 64 32 16 8 4 2 1 1
18 128 64 32 16 8 4 2 1
19 265 128 64 32 16 8 4 2
20 530 256 128 64 32 16 8 4
21 1050 522 256 128 64 32 16 8
22 2100 1044 512 256 128 64 32 16
23 4200 2077 1035 512 256 128 64 32
24 8400 4154 2070 1024 512 256 128 64
25 16800 8308 4128 2060 1024 512 256 128
TABLE 2. Complete simple games with minimum (r = 1) per Nakamura number – part 2
n ∞ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17
1 1
2 2 1
3 4 2 1
4 8 5 1 1
5 16 8 4 1 1
6 31 14 7 2 1 1
7 57 20 11 6 2 1 1
8 99 30 16 10 3 2 1 1
9 163 40 26 11 8 3 2 1 1
10 256 55 32 18 13 4 3 2 1 1
11 386 70 45 25 14 10 4 3 2 1 1
12 562 91 59 33 16 16 5 4 3 2 1 1
13 794 112 74 42 25 17 12 5 4 3 2 1 1
14 1093 140 91 52 34 19 19 6 5 4 3 2 1 1
15 1471 168 117 63 44 21 20 14 6 5 4 3 2 1
16 1941 204 136 84 46 32 22 22 7 6 5 4 3 2
17 2517 240 166 96 59 43 24 23 16 7 6 5 4 3
18 3214 285 198 110 72 55 26 25 25 8 7 6 5 4
19 4048 330 231 136 86 57 39 27 26 18 8 7 6 5
20 5036 385 267 163 101 60 52 29 28 28 9 8 7 6
21 6196 440 316 179 117 76 66 31 30 29 20 9 8 7
22 7547 506 355 210 134 92 68 46 32 31 31 10 9 8
23 9109 572 409 242 152 109 71 61 34 33 32 22 10 9
24 10903 650 466 276 171 127 74 77 36 35 34 34 11 10
25 12951 728 524 311 207 130 93 79 53 37 36 35 24 11
TABLE 3. Weighted games with minimum (r = 1) per Nakamura number
alternatives. The larger the Nakamura number of a rule, the greater the number of alternatives the rule can rationally
deal with. This paper provides new results on: the computation of the Nakamura number, lower and upper bounds
for it or the maximum achievable Nakamura number for subclasses of simple games and parameters as the number
of players and the number of equivalent types of them. We highlight the results found in the classes of weighted,
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complete, and α-roughly weighted simple games. In addition, some enumerations for some classes of games with
a given Nakamura number are obtained.
Further relations of the Nakamura number to other concepts of cooperative game theory like the price of stability
of a simple game or the one-dimensional cutting stock problem are provided.
As future research, it would be interesting to study the truth of Conjecture 1 or finding new results on the
Nakamura number for other interesting subclasses simple games, as for example, weakly complete simple games.
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